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The distributional effects of international outsourcing in a 2×2
production model
Abstract
This paper examines the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two-sector, two-factor
model. The analysis allows for switches between diversified and specialized equilibria. Also, equilibria
in which only some firms of a sector outsource (incomplete or partial outsourcing) are considered. It is
the interplay of the cost-saving and substitution effects of international outsourcing that determines the
nature of the outsourcing equilibrium and its distributional consequences.
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1. Introduction 
After trade and skill-biased technological change, fragmentation and outsourcing have been 
put forward as explanations for the rising wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor (cf. 
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b; Slaughter, 2000).1 Moving the production of intermediate inputs 
intensive in the relatively scarce factor of the economy to a foreign country, depresses demand for the 
scarce factor in the source country. This conclusion has been challenged by Arndt (1997). The 
intuitively appealing idea, that in an industrialized, capital-rich country labor is set free if firms have 
access to cheap foreign labor, may be misleading in the general equilibrium for the following reason. 
The mere fact that firms have access to cheap labor makes them relatively more competitive so that 
they expand production. According to the analysis of Arndt, the positive employment effect resulting 
from the expansion of production outweighs the negative effect of substituting home labor with 
foreign labor. This leads to the somewhat surprising conclusion that outsourcing is beneficial for 
(unskilled) home labor, not harmful and points to the sector bias of international outsourcing. (See 
also Arndt, 1998; and Egger and Egger, 2001.) In the literature the discussion on whether it is the 
factor bias (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b, 1999) or the sector bias (Arndt, 1997, 1998a) which 
matters for relative factor rewards is well-known from the debate of Leamer (1998) and Krugman 
(2000) on how technological change matters for wages. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) speak of an 
"apparent conflict in the literature" (p. 908). Whereas Leamer argues that the sector bias is relevant in 
a small open economy, Krugman maintains that in a closed or large open economy it is the factor bias 
that matters.2 
It is the purpose of this study to present a systematic analysis of the impact of outsourcing on 
factor returns in the general equilibrium of an open economy. For a comprehensive picture, it is 
important to include the possibility of specialization in addition to diversification equilibria.3 
Moreover, one has to account for the fact that also within one and the same sector we may observe 
                                                 
1 The empirical findings in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) "... support the idea that both foreign outsourcing and 
expenditures on computers have played a role in the increase of the relative wage for nonproduction workers, 
..." (p. 938) 
2 Xu (2001) analyzes the factor price effects of technical progress by distinguishing between factor-augmenting 
bias, factor-using bias and sector bias. 
3 Krugman (2000) points out, that under certain conditions the results of technological change for a closed 
economy are similar to the results found for a one-sector small open economy. 
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outsourcing firms and non-outsourcing firms at the same time. The results are based on the general 
insight of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that in a diversification equilibrium factor prices are 
determined by goods prices and technologies alone, whereas a change in factor endowments is 
irrelevant. Therefore, in an economy in which goods prices are given by the world market, 
outsourcing can only affect the distribution of factor incomes insofar as the technology of production 
is changed by the outsourcing firms. Of course, things change in the case of specialization equilibria. 
In this case, factor endowments have a crucial role for the determination of factor prices. In particular, 
if international outsourcing affects the number of active sectors, the distributional effects of 
international outsourcing are more subtle. Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) argue that "... the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin logic applies to small changes in technology, whereas the process of fragmentation 
is definitely not a marginal phenomenon." (p. 28) Or to state it in words of Jones (2000) "The reason 
that standard Heckscher-Ohlin logic fails is that such logic is appropriate for relative small changes, 
those that do not induce a change in the production pattern." (p. 129) Our analysis of international 
outsourcing considers such large changes. In a two-sector model, a change in the pattern of production 
arises if the economy switches from diversified to specialized equilibria or vice versa after firms have 
got access to international outsourcing.4 We provide a systematic analysis of such switches and their 
impacts on factor prices. 
In Section 2 we show first, that for an individual firm access to international outsourcing is 
formally equivalent to a choice between production techniques. However, in contrast to mere 
technical progress which makes new techniques profitable at given factor prices, international 
outsourcing involves also a change in the set of relevant factor prices. Therefore, international 
outsourcing may become attractive as progress in coordination techniques makes fragmentation and 
outsourced production (be it national or international) more profitable but also when international 
integration gives to a firm access to cheap foreign production inputs. Based on the dual approach of 
the 2x2-production model with its diagrammatic representation of unit isocost curves in factor price 
space, we formally identify the assumptions that allow us to treat international outsourcing as 
                                                 
4 The production pattern also changes if different sectors are active in the specialized non-outsourcing and the 
specialized outsourcing equilibrium. 
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equivalent to technical adoption.5 This gives us a powerful tool for determining the possible 
outsourcing equilibria and the distributional effects of international outsourcing in these equilibria, 
including specialization equilibria as well as equilibria in which only part of the firms within a sector 
choose the outsourcing option. Section 3 presents the results of this analysis. Compared with other 
recent studies,6 our goal is to provide in a 2x2 model a complete picture of the effect of international 
outsourcing on specialization and diversification in the economy’s production structure. By allowing 
for changes in the production pattern of an economy, we gain deeper insights about how cost-saving 
and substitution effects interact in determining both the type of outsourcing equilibrium and the 
distributional consequences of international outsourcing. In Section 4 we discuss our main findings 
and compare them to the literature. A short conclusion completes the paper. 
Two aspects are beyond the scope of this analysis. First, we do not consider the impact of 
outsourcing on the rest of the world. Therefore we are not able to address the question of international 
factor price equalization.7 Second, the focus of this paper lies on vertical outsourcing.8 
2. Cross border outsourcing in a 2x2 production model 
2.1. Definitions and assumptions 
We consider a small open economy endowed with two types of primary inputs K and L used 
in the production of two sectors i = 1,2. The output of sector i  is denoted as iS . All markets are 
perfectly competitive and primary factors are mobile across sectors but internationally immobile. 
Production functions are linearly homogenous and strictly increasing, and the unit isocost curves are 
strictly convex. Compared to integrated production within a firm outsourced production is based on 
two requirements. First, it must be technologically possible to split up the production process in 
several fragments. Second, external transaction costs and market conditions must be such that a firm 
                                                 
5 As Mussa (1979) pointed out, this “diagrammatic technique ... is particularly useful in illustrating the 
properties of the two sector model which are essentially concerned with prices” (p. 525). Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) used the dual approach in their discussion on the impact of technologies on factor prices. See also Jones 
and Kierzkowski (2001b) on the relation between international outsourcing and technical progress. 
6 See Arndt (1997, 1998a), Egger (2002), Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a). Kohler (2003) 
provides a systematic analysis of the general n m× -model, however, without the possibility that the number of 
active production sectors changes due to outsourcing. 
7 The issue of international factor-price equalization is discussed in Deardorff (2001a, 2001b). 
8 For a comparison of trade flows under horizontal and vertical fragmentation, see Venables (1999). 
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prefers purchasing fragments from outside the firm to in-house production. The following definitions 
provide a formal description of these aspects. 9 
Definition 1 (Fragmentation). Let ( ),f K L  be a production function for commodity S and let 
( )( ),jx K L=x , 1,...,j m= , denote a vector of intermediate production functions. Then, x  is said 
to be a fragmentation of integrated production, f , if there exists a "complementing" technology 
( ), ,g K L x , such that for all ( ) 2,K L ∈R  
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 1 1 1, , , , , ..., ,m m mf K L g K L x K L x K L=  
for some ( )0 0,K L , ( ) 2,j jK L ∈R , 1, ...,j m= . 
Technology g may contain production processes, final assembly or simply consist of organizational 
and managerial activities necessary for coordinating fragmentation. Changes from integrated to 
fragmented production are not bound to international outsourcing. They generally play an important 
role in the discussion about organizational and technological change fostered by progress in 
information processing, logistics and management techniques.10 
Whereas fragmentation means the splitting up of a production process independent of whether 
this occurs in-house or implies input purchases from outside the firm, outsourcing is characterized by 
a separation of production and involves market transactions.11 In sum, outsourcing requires a 
fragmentation of the production process but not vice versa. 
Definition 2 (Outsourcing). Let x  be a fragmentation of f  with complementing technology g .  
Then, outsourcing by a firm of intermediate { }1,...,j m∈  means that the firm employs g instead of 
                                                 
9 In the literature, the phenomenon of outsourcing has been labeled in various way: “slicing up the value chain“ 
(Krugman, 1995), “disintegration of production” (Feenstra, 1998), “multi-stage production” (Dixit and 
Grossman, 1982), “intra-product (or super-) specialization” (Arndt, 1998b). In recent years, the terms 
“fragmentation” (Deardorff 2001a, 2001b; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001a) and “outsourcing”, (Feenstra, 1998; 
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a; Kohler, 2001; Grossman and Helpman, 2002a) have become common. For an 
overview, see Hummels et al. (2001). 
10 For a discussion on ( )g ⋅  in an international context see Kohler (2001). 
11 The interaction between separated production units could also be handled by contractual arrangements within 
multinational enterprises (see Markusen, 2002). In contrast to this, the notion of outsourcing refers to 
intermediate goods trade. For a distinction between outsourcing and intra-firm transactions of multinational 
enterprises see also Grossman and Helpman (2002b). 
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f  and purchases ( ),j j jx K L  from outside the firm. We say that intermediate j is internationally 
outsourced if ( ),j j jx K L  is purchased from abroad, while the firm operating the complementing 
technology g  is located at home.  
In this paper we do not consider within-firm fragmentation or national outsourcing and focus 
on international outsourcing in one sector only.12 Outsourced production consists of two component 
stages, that is, there is one intermediate input. Thus, output in sector i  is given by ( ),i i i if fS f K L=  
under integrated production and by ( )( )* *, , ,i i i i i i ig gS g K L x K L=  under outsourcing. Subscripts f 
and g refer to factor use in integrated and fragmented modes of production, respectively. The asterisk 
indicates levels of foreign factor inputs. 
Let i i if K f L fC w K w L≡ +  and ( )* *,i i i i ig K g L g x K LC w K w L c w w x≡ + +  be production costs 
in sector i without and with international outsourcing, respectively. Domestic prices of K and L are 
denoted by Kw and Lw , respectively, while ( )* *,ix K Lc w w is the cost of a unit of the imported 
intermediate good ix , determined by the foreign technology for ix , by foreign factor prices, *Kw  and 
*
Lw , and any trade costs.
13 Foreign factor prices are taken as given. 
Our analysis is based on the dual approach of the 2x2-production model. Therefore, we have 
to specify the unit-isocost curves for integrated and outsourcing production technologies. Denote by 
( ),if K Lc w w  the minimum unit cost of production in sector i without international outsourcing. 
Moreover, let ( ),if K Lk w w  be the factor intensity /i if fK L  in sector i  under integrated production. 
Cost minimization under outsourcing implies the minimum-cost combination of ix  and home-
supplied factor inputs K, L. For production technology g and given unit costs ixc , let 
( ), ,i iK K L xa w w c , ( ), ,i iL K L xa w w c , ( ), ,i ix K L xa w w c  be the minimum-cost input coefficients of 
                                                 
12 See Arndt (1997, 1998a), Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) for a similar approach. 
13 Note that neither technologies nor factor prices must be identical in the two countries. 
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home factors ,K L  and intermediate input ix , respectively. Then, the minimum unit cost of 
production in sector i  under international outsourcing is given by the function 
( )* *, ,i i i i i ig K L x K K L L x xc w w c w a w a c a≡ + + , 
with ( )* * *,i ix x K Lc c w w≡ . * *,K Lw w  and thus *ixc  are exogenously given for the small economy. 
Perfect competition implies zero profits. Thus, ( ) ( ){ }*min , , , ,i i i if K L g K L xc w w c w w c p= , 
for each sector i. Unit isocost functions ifc  and 
i
gc  have standard properties. They are linearly 
homogeneous in their arguments and the isocost curves in the ( ,K Lw w )-space are negatively sloped 
and strictly convex.  The slope 
i
f
L
K c const
dw
dw
=
−  is given by ifk  and the slope 
i
g
L
K c const
dw
dw
=
−  is 
given by ( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
, ,
, ,
, ,
i i
K K L xi i
g K L x i i
L K L x
a w w c
k w w c
a w w c
= . Moreover, strict convexity implies 
2
2 0
i
f
L
K c const
d w
dw
=
>  and 
2
2 0
i
g
L
K c const
d w
dw
=
> . 
The sign of */i ig xk c∂ ∂  depends on whether domestic capital or labor is substituted by the 
outsourced intermediate component. 
Definition 3.  International outsourcing is cost-saving at domestic factor prices ,K Lw w  if 
( ) ( )*, , ,i i if K L g K L xc w w c w w c> .14 
                                                 
14 Since */ 0i ig xc c∂ ∂ > , international outsourcing will be attractive, if the foreign country employs a superior 
technology  for the production of intermediate input ix  or if factor prices are lower abroad, due to endowment 
differences. It is worth noting that if factor price differences are large enough, and trade costs are low, the 
outsourcing technology (including the outsourced intermediate process) may at given factor prices be strictly 
more resource-demanding than the integrated production technology. This has been first noted by Deardorff 
(2001a) and highlights the main difference to resource-saving technical progress. With respect to the dynamics 
of international outsourcing, Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) point out that, besides declining 
tariffs and legal non-tariff barriers, declining costs for service links, which are required for coordination and 
communication activities, may explain why exploitation of lower foreign factor prices by outsourcing became 
accessible in recent years. Formally, such changes in transaction costs are reflected by a lower *ixc . 
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The following definition characterizes the type of international outsourcing with respect to its 
factor-intensity impact. 
Definition 4.  Let ,K Lw w  be a pair of factor prices fulfilling ( )*, ,i i ig K L xc w w c p= . We say that 
there is labor-outsourcing (capital-outsourcing) at ,K Lw w , if ( ) ( ) ( )*, , ,i i ig K L x f K Lk w w c k w w> < . 
We also say that outsourcing substitutes labor (capital) and conserves capital (labor, respectively). 
It is assumed that over the relevant range of factor prices the production techniques can be 
ranked according to factor intensities. Factor-intensity reversals are not considered. (A formal 
discussion of this assumption is provided in the appendix.) 
2.2. Equilibria 
 Equilibria without and with international outsourcing (referred to as non-outsourcing and 
outsourcing equilibria, respectively) are determined by factor endowments, production technologies 
and by given world market prices.  In Fig. 1, the different types of non-outsourcing equilibria of a 
small open economy are shown. The set of factor prices which is consistent with non-positive profits 
is given by fΨ , where fψ  is its frontier. Equilibrium factor prices are subject to the following 
condition: ( ), fK Lw w ψ∈ . For a given frontier fψ , i.e. given production technologies and world 
market prices, ip , ip− , relative factor endowment k  determines the non-outsourcing equilibrium. 
Point A in Fig. 1 shows a diversified non-outsourcing equilibrium with factor prices ,f fK Lw w . Points B 
and C describe specialized equilibria with factor endowments ( ),f fif K Lk k w w′ >  and 
( ),f fif K Lk k w w′′ < , respectively. 
(Fig. 1 about here) 
To identify the type of equilibrium resulting when firms get access to cost-saving outsourcing, it is 
important to note that three technologies are relevant, namely, the two integrated production modes 
and one outsourcing technology. Let ( ) ( ){ }*, , ,g i i ii K L g K L xw w c w w c pΨ ≡ ≥ . The set of factor 
prices which is consistent with non-positive profits is then determined by ( )g g fiΨ ≡ Ψ Ψ∩ . Let 
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gψ  denote the lower frontier of gΨ . As in the non-outsourcing case, for a given lower frontier gψ , 
i.e. given production technologies and world market prices, relative factor endowment k  determines 
which type of outsourcing equilibrium is realized under perfect competition. The cost-saving effect of 
international outsourcing, implies g fΨ ⊂ Ψ .  
(Fig. 2 about here) 
Fig. 2 shows a diversified equilibrium before and after firms of the K-intensive sector get 
access to cost-saving international outsourcing.15 The cost-saving effect of international outsourcing, 
i.e. ( ) ( )*, , ,f f f fi i if g xK L K Lc w w c w w c>  at given non-outsourcing equilibrium factor prices fKw  and 
f
Lw , implies an outward shift of the ( ),K Lw w -combinations at which the unit production costs of 
the K-intensive sector equal the given price ip . Note as a first result, that technology if  vanishes 
( ( ) ( )*, , ,g g g gi i i if g xK L K Lc w w c w w c p> = ) in the K-intensive sector if international outsourcing is cost-
saving and the outsourcing equilibrium is diversified. 
 
3. Distributional effects of international outsourcing 
In this section we give a systematic exposition of the distributional effects of international 
outsourcing for all possible equilibrium situations. We use the diversification/specialization 
dichotomy as an organizing principle for the exposition. For a given (diversified or specialized) non-
outsourcing equilibrium, the type of outsourcing equilibrium depends on cost-saving and substitution 
effects of international outsourcing. Graphically (Fig. 2), the first effect corresponds to the outward 
shift of the i igc p= -locus (relative to 
i i
fc p= ), whereas the second effect is reflected by the rotation 
of igc  relative to 
i
fc . In order to make it easier to keep track of the various diversification and 
specialization equilibria, we enumerate in Table 1 all possible combinations of non-outsourcing and 
outsourcing equilibria when the K-intensive sector has access to cost-saving international outsourcing. 
                                                 
15 The assumption that production technologies can be ranked according to factor intensities implies that neither 
the ifc -curve nor the 
i
gc -curve can cross the 
i
fc
− -curve twice. 
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Columns characterize sectoral production patterns in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, while rows 
describe the outsourcing equilibrium.  
(Table 1 about here) 
3.1. A diversified outsourcing equilibrium 
 We start our analysis with the standard H-O set-up of diversified equilibria. This case is 
represented in Fig. 2 under the assumption that there is labor-outsourcing in the K-intensive sector. 
We see the established result that if both non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria are diversified, 
then the real return to the factor used intensively in the outsourcing sector increases whereas the real 
return to the other factor decreases.16 
The result follows from the properties of frontier fψ  and the fact that a diversified 
outsourcing equilibrium must lie on that segment of fψ  which represents the zero-profit conditions 
for the non-outsourcing sector. This confirms the finding in the literature that the impact of 
international outsourcing on factor returns exhibits a sector bias. In Fig. 2 the K-intensive sector i 
obtains access to cost-saving international outsourcing, so that the factor-price outcome lies on lower 
frontier fψ  to the right of non-outsourcing equilibrium point A. As a result factor K gains, and factor 
L loses.17 
Note that factor intensity rankings are preserved in the case of diversified equilibria. Under 
diversification, factor price combinations always lie on frontier fψ  to the north-west of non-
outsourcing equilibrium point A in Fig. 1, if the L-intensive sector has cost-saving access to 
international outsourcing, and to the south-east of point A, if the K-intensive sector has cost-saving 
access to international outsourcing. Since outsourcing is cost-saving, the i igc p= -locus in Fig. 2 lies 
above A. Therefore, i ig fk k
−>  (as shown at point A′  in Fig. 2) if outsourcing occurs in the K-
intensive sector i. For the same reason, i if gk k
−>  if L-intensive sector i−  has access to cost-saving 
outsourcing (see A′′  where the dotted line represents igc
− ). 
                                                 
16 This corresponds to case DD in Table 1. 
17 See Arndt (1997, 1998a) for a similar finding. 
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Next, we analyze the effects of outsourcing when the non-outsourcing equilibrium is 
specialized and the outsourcing equilibrium is diversified. This means that international outsourcing 
fundamentally changes the production pattern in the economy.18 In the following, a sector (active or 
not) is said to be intensive in a factor if at given relative factor prices cost-minimization implies a 
relatively more intensive use of the factor under the integrated technology if  than under the 
integrated technology if −  of the other sector.19 
Theorem 1 (a) If only the outsourcing sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and 
outsourcing substitutes the factor intensively used in the outsourcing sector, then outsourcing cannot 
lead to a diversified outsourcing equilibrium. (b) If international outsourcing leads from a specialized 
non-outsourcing equilibrium to a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, the impacts of outsourcing on 
factor prices are the same as in Theorem 1 except for one case, namely: If the outsourcing sector is 
inactive in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and outsourcing substitutes the factor which is intensive 
in this sector, then the impact on both factor returns is ambiguous. 
For a graphical proof 20, Fig. 3 shows a situation where firms in the K-intensive sector i have 
access to cost-saving international outsourcing. A diversified outsourcing equilibrium must lie on 
frontier fψ  south-east of intersection point A. We must distinguish between two cases. First, if the K-
intensive outsourcing sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium (like in point B), it is clear 
that factor K gains, whereas factor L loses, since the diversified outsourcing equilibrium lies to the 
south-east of A and thus south-east of B. Moreover, capital-outsourcing cannot lead to a diversified 
outsourcing equilibrium, since both isocost curves would be flatter than k ′  at possible candidates for 
a diversified equilibrium. In sum, if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized in the outsourcing 
sector i, the factor bias determines whether a diversified outsourcing equilibrium is possible. 
However, if there is a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, then it is the sector bias of international 
outsourcing, which determines the factor price developments. 
                                                 
18 See the discussion in Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) on the importance of outsourcing-
induced changes in production pattern. 
19 Part (a) of Theorem 2 shows that case KD in Table 1 is only possible if there is L-outsourcing. Part (b) deals 
with this case as well as with LD. 
20 Full-length formal proofs can be found in the working paper version available from the authors. 
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(Fig. 3 about here) 
Second, if the outsourcing sector i is inactive in the non-outsourcing equilibrium (like in point 
C), then factor price reactions are ambiguous if there is capital-outsourcing in capital-intensive-sector 
sector i. In Fig. 3 points A′  and A′′  refer to two possible factor price outcomes.21 An equilibrium like 
A′  results if access to cost-saving international outsourcing does not affect the ranking of sectors 
according to their factor intensities, and it is again the sector bias which determines the factor-price 
effects of international outsourcing. If the economy moves from non-outsourcing equilibrium C to 
outsourcing equilibrium A′ , factor K, which is used intensively in outsourcing sector i, gains and L 
loses.  
Different factor-price effects result in an outsourcing equilibrium like A′′ . Such an 
equilibrium is possible if the substitution effect of outsourcing is strong enough so that it leads to a 
change in the factor intensity ranking of sectors, i.e. if K-intensive sector i becomes L-intensive in the 
outsourcing equilibrium. (In Fig. 3, this possibility is indicated by the relatively flat dotted line igc"  
through point A′′ .) In this case the factor that is intensively used in the outsourcing sector (under 
integrated production) loses, whereas the other factor gains. In Fig. 3, factor K loses and factor L gains 
if access to international outsourcing shifts equilibrium factor-price combinations from C to ''A . 
Finally, if there is labor-outsourcing in the capital-intensive non-outsourcing sector, i.e. if unit 
isocost curve igc  is steeper at point C than unit isocost curve 
i
fc , then the diversified outsourcing 
equilibrium must lie on frontier fψ  south-east of non-outsourcing equilibrium C, like point A′ . 
Since a change in the ranking of sectors cannot arise, it is again the sector bias which determines 
factor price outcomes. 
These findings are summarized in Table 2 for outsourcing in the K-intensive sector.  In this 
matrix, “+” and “–” mean that international outsourcing has a positive or negative impact on the 
respective real or relative factor price. A “amb.” indicates that the impact is ambiguous. 
                                                 
21 Note that point C is also a candidate for a diversified outsourcing equilibrium, namely if the two loci i igc p=  
and i ifc p
− −
=  coincide. In this border line case factor prices are not affected by international outsourcing. 
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(Table 2 about here) 
3.2. A specialized outsourcing equilibrium 
 This section focuses on specialized outsourcing equilibria. In the specialized outsourcing 
equilibrium factor prices may be such that both the integrated technology and the outsourcing 
technology are consistent with zero profits. Firms switch from integrated production to outsourcing as 
long as the adoption of the outsourcing technology is profitable under given factor prices. When many 
firms switch, the factor prices change and may settle at values at which firms are indifferent between 
integrated production and outsourcing. We distinguish three cases: (i) In the non-outsourcing 
equilibrium as well as in the outsourcing equilibrium the country is specialized in the outsourcing 
sector. (ii) Cost-saving access to international outsourcing in sector i leads from a diversified non-
outsourcing equilibrium to specialization in the outsourcing sector. (iii) Specialization occurs in the 
non-outsourcing sector in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, and shifts to the other sector in the 
outsourcing equilibrium. In (ii) and (iii) international outsourcing again fundamentally changes the 
production pattern in the economy. Theorem 2 states the distributional effects of cost-saving 
international outsourcing in sector i for case (i), i.e. if the production pattern is not altered.22 
Theorem 2 If the country is specialized in production in outsourcing sector i in both the non-
outsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium, then the following holds.  
(a) If outsourcing conserves the factor which is intensively used in outsourcing sector i, then the real 
return to that factor increases. The real return to the other factor declines if both the integrated (f) 
and the outsourcing (g) technology are in use. The impact on the real return to this factor is 
ambiguous if only outsourcing technology g survives.  
(b) If outsourcing substitutes the factor intensively used in outsourcing sector i, then the real return to 
this factor decreases if both the integrated (f) and the outsourcing (g) technology are in use in sector 
i. The impact on the real return to this factor is ambiguous if only the outsourcing technology 
survives. The real return to the other factor always increases. 
Fig. 4 shows part (a) of Theorem 2 for the case of labor-outsourcing in the K-intensive sector. 
Point B represents a non-outsourcing equilibrium specialized in production in the K-intensive 
                                                 
22 Theorem 2 corresponds to case KK in Table 1. 
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outsourcing sector i. Since the equilibrium is specialized, factor intensity at B is equal to k ′ . Both 
technologies f and g can be in use only if the outsourcing equilibrium is at the intersection of the 
i i
gc p= -locus and the 
i i
fc p= -locus and the intersection ( A′ ) lies between A and B in Fig. 4.
23 In 
this case factor K gains, whereas factor L loses. North-west of B all firms would produce with higher 
K-intensity than k ′ . 
(Fig. 4 about here) 
If only outsourcing technology g survives, then the new outsourcing equilibrium lies on 
frontier gψ  within the interval A D′ . (Because of L-outsourcing, at point D factor intensity under 
technology g is higher than factor intensity under f at point B.) A possible outcome is point A′′ , where 
factor K gains and factor L  loses. However, Lw  does not necessarily decline. Depending on the 
strength of the substitution (rotation) relative to the cost-saving (shift) effect, the new equilibrium 
factor price outcome may lie on any point on the segment A D′ . As a consequence, the impact on the 
return to substituted factor L is ambiguous. Relative factor returns always increase in favor of factor 
K. 
Fig. 5 shows part (b) of Theorem 2 for the case of capital-outsourcing in K-intensive sector i. 
Capital intensity at point D under technology g is lower than k ′ . Therefore, an outsourcing 
equilibrium specialized in sector i must lie on segment A D′  north-west of D. Factor L gains both in 
real and relative terms, independently of whether the integrated production technology survives in the 
outsourcing equilibrium. If integrated technology f survives, i.e. if the outsourcing equilibrium is 
given by intersection point 'A , the return to factor K  declines. In contrast, if only outsourcing 
technology g is in use in the outsourcing equilibrium, the impact on the return to factor K is 
ambiguous. 
(Fig. 5 about here) 
In sum, we find that access to international outsourcing exhibits a factor-biased effect on 
factor returns, if the country is specialized in the outsourcing sector in both the non-outsourcing as 
                                                 
23 A represents the intersection point of the i ifc p= -locus with the 
i i
fc p
− −
= locus. 
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well as the outsourcing equilibrium. This result coincides with the findings for factor-biased 
technological change in one-sector models.24 
Theorem 3 characterizes the distributional effects for the remaining two cases, namely, case 
(ii), in which access to international outsourcing leads to a reduction in the number of active sectors, 
and case (iii) with non-outsourcing sector i−  active in the specialized non-outsourcing equilibrium. 
Note that the following theorem covers case (ii) as well as case (iii), since in both cases the non-
outsourcing sector i−  is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium.25 
Theorem 3 If the non-outsourcing sector –i is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and the 
country is specialized in production in outsourcing sector i in the outsourcing equilibrium, then the 
results of Theorem 2 hold with the following two modifications. Under the assumptions of part (a), 
integrated technology f cannot survive in equilibrium. Under the assumptions of part (b), outsourcing 
has an ambiguous effect on both factor prices if only technology g survives in the outsourcing 
equilibrium. 
The first modification can be seen from Fig. 4. If the non-outsourcing equilibrium is 
diversified (point A ) or specialized in the L-intensive non-outsourcing sector i−  (point C), cost-
saving labor-outsourcing shifts the relevant i igc p= -locus to the right of A or C, respectively. (See 
e.g. the dotted line igc"  with an intersection point south-east of C.) But then only outsourcing 
technology g can survive in the specialized outsourcing equilibrium.26 This implies igk  equals relative 
factor endowment, which is possible at factor prices north-west of the intersection point of the igc" -
locus with frontier fψ . Whereas factor K gains in both real and relative terms, the impact on the 
return to factor L is ambiguous. (See Theorem 2 part (a).) 
                                                 
24 In a simple example, Krugman (2000) has shown that the factor bias of technical change identified in a one-
sector model can be reproduced in a large-country two- sector model. This is in contrast to the findings for small 
open economies, where technical change exhibits a sector-biased effect on factor prices, see Leamer (2000). 
25 Theorem 3 corresponds to cases DK and LK in Table 1. 
26 If the integrated technology is in use in the outsourcing equilibrium, substitution of factor L tends to work 
against complete specialization. Specialization therefore requires that the cost-saving effect of international 
outsourcing is “sufficiently large” so that non-outsourcing sector i−  vanishes. 
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The ambiguity arising under (b) can be seen in Fig. 5. Again, since the non-outsourcing sector 
i−  is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, we start at point A or C, respectively. Then, in the 
case of capital-outsourcing the relevant i igc p= -locus is relatively flat compared to 
i i
fc p= . If the 
intersection point of the i igc p= -locus with the 
i i
fc p= -locus lies north-west of A, both integrated 
technology f as well as outsourcing technology g may be in use in the outsourcing equilibrium. In this 
case, the return to factor L increases, whereas the return to factor K declines, due to the factor bias of 
international outsourcing. In contrast, if only outsourcing technology g survives, the outsourcing 
equilibrium lies on frontier gψ , south-east of A′ , and the impact of outsourcing on returns Kw  and 
Lw  as well as on relative factor returns /K Lw w  is ambiguous.  
Suppose, for example, that the non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversified and therefore given 
by point A in Fig. 5. Then, the real return to factor K increases if and only if the outsourcing 
equilibrium lies to the right of 'E . The real return to factor L increases if and only if the outsourcing 
equilibrium lies above E ′′ . Due to the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing, at least one 
factor gains if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversified.27 The ambiguity in relative factor price 
developments arises, since there is no clear dominance of the two relevant effects, namely the rotation 
(factor bias) and the shift (sector bias) of the relevant unit isocost curve of outsourcing sector i. 
Table 3 provides a complete listing of real and relative factor price effects if the outsourcing 
equilibrium is specialized. As in Table 2, outsourcing is assumed to occur in the K-intensive sector. 
Regarding the possible non-outsourcing equilibria, we have two cases, namely one where the L-
intensive (non-outsourcing) sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and one where it is 
not. The first case corresponds to Theorem 3, the second case to Theorem 2.28 
(Table 3 about here) 
                                                 
27 If the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the non-outsourcing sector i−  and if the two loci 
i i
gc p=  and 
i i
fc p
− −
=  coincide, then point C is also a candidate for a specialized outsourcing equilibrium. In 
this border line case factor prices are not affected by international outsourcing. 
28 This is different from Table 2, where the inactivity/activity dichotomy refers to the K-intensive outsourcing 
sector. 
 18
3.3. International outsourcing and the Pareto-criterion 
Concerning the welfare effects of international outsourcing, the impacts on factor prices 
derived above directly lead to the following assessment. 
Theorem 4 In a 2x2 production framework with linear homogeneous technologies, no factor 
intensity reversal and given commodity prices, access to cost-saving international outsourcing does 
not lead to a Pareto-improvement, if the integrated technology is used in at least one sector in the 
outsourcing equilibrium. If integrated technologies are totally replaced by outsourcing technologies 
both factors may possibly gain. 
Theorem 4 directly follows from the properties of frontier fψ  and the fact that the set of 
Pareto-improving factor price outcomes is a strict subset of contour set fΨ . To see this, consider in 
Fig. 5 the diversified non-outsourcing equilibrium at point A. Then, the set of Pareto-improving factor 
price developments lies within the two dashed lines through point A. Factor price outcomes which lie 
on frontier fψ  are not consistent with a Pareto-improvement. This implies that a Pareto-improving 
factor price effect of international outsourcing can only arise if the small country specializes in 
production in the outsourcing sector and if integrated technologies (f) are driven out of the market. 
(See the second and the fourth row of Table 3.) In particular, a Pareto-improving factor price effect of 
international outsourcing in sector i arises if the cost-saving and substitution effects of outsourcing are 
such that the outsourcing equilibrium lies within interval E E′ ′′  on frontier gψ , like point E. 
 
4. Discussion 
In the discussion of the distributional effects of international outsourcing, the literature 
distinguishes between factor-biased and sector-biased impacts of international outsourcing (Kohler, 
2001). Whereas the former is analyzed within one-sector models (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b), the 
analysis in a two-sector framework shows that the factor-bias of international outsourcing, i.e. the 
factor intensity of the outsourced intermediate input, is of no interest as long as diversified equilibria 
are considered. Rather, the relevant question is in which sector outsourcing occurs (Arndt, 1997, 
1998a). As shown in Section 3, this result holds only if both the non-outsourcing as well as the 
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outsourcing equilibrium are diversified. However, since the type of outsourcing equilibrium itself 
depends on the interplay of substitution and cost-saving effects of international outsourcing, a 
restriction on diversified equilibria implies a restriction on the possible forms of international 
outsourcing. As Theorems 1-3 make clear, the distinction between sector and factor bias alone is not 
sufficient to give a comprehensive picture of the distributional effects of international outsourcing. 
Section 3 addresses distributional issues even if international outsourcing is not complete. If 
cost-saving international outsourcing becomes available in one sector, it may nonetheless pay for 
some firms in this sector to retain the integrated mode of production in the outsourcing equilibrium. 
Thus, the integrated technology may co-exist with the outsourcing technology. This is especially 
relevant with respect to real-world considerations. In line with Krugman’s (2000) finding for a one-
sector economy, we show in Table 3 that the factor bias of international outsourcing remains the 
relevant force in determining factor prices if the integrated production mode survives and co-exist 
with the outsourcing technology. 
International outsourcing may change the pattern of production (see Jones, 2000; and Jones 
and Kierzkowski, 2001a). Consider the case of a small open economy completely specialized in the 
absence of outsourcing. Then, international outsourcing opportunities in the non-viable sector may 
lead to diversified production in the outsourcing equilibrium. The textile industry, for example, which 
migrated to developing countries (mainly in Asia), has been reactivated in the industrialized world in 
the last few years, using fragmentation and international outsourcing opportunities. 
Finally, international outsourcing is Pareto-improving only if integrated technologies are 
totally replaced by outsourcing technologies. With respect to the Pareto criterion, the assumptions of 
perfect competition and intersectoral mobility are of course crucial for our conclusions. In reality, 
adjustment costs may cause losers at least in the short run. Moreover, the analysis above does not 
incorporate any fixed costs of international outsourcing, which may yield a welfare decline in the 
outsourcing economy (Kohler, 2001). Finally, the constant price assumption makes our analysis 
suitable for small open economies only. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we identify under which assumptions we can treat international outsourcing like 
technical progress. This approach and the advantages of the dual representation of the 2x2-production 
model allow us to distinguish two driving forces, namely, a substitution and a cost-saving effect of 
international outsourcing. They determine the type of outsourcing equilibrium (relative to the non-
outsourcing equilibrium) and the factor-price consequences of international outsourcing.  
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Appendix: Factor Intensities 
We make the usual assumption that there is no factor intensity reversal under integrated 
production. Formally, if ( ) ( ), ,i if K L f K Lk w w k w w−≷  for some ,K Lw w , then 
( ) ( ), ,i if K L f K Lk w w k w w−′ ′ ′ ′≷  for all possible factor prices ,K Lw w′ ′ . (Note that ,i if fk k−  depend only on 
relative factor prices not on their level.) Outsourcing means that in one of the two sectors { },j i i∈ −  a 
new technology is available. Comparisons between integrated and outsourcing modes of production 
can only be made if outsourcing and integrated technologies can be ranked according to their factor 
intensities. Unfortunately, jgk  may change with proportional variations in ,K Lw w  since 
j
gk  is also a 
function of *jxc . Only if the outsourcing technology is separable, in the sense that 
( ) ( )( ), , , ,j j j j jg K L x g h K L x= "  for some linearly homogeneous jg"  and jh , jgk  depends only on 
relative factor prices /K Lw w . However, it is not necessary to rank ( )*, ,j jg K L xk w w c  relative to 
( ),if K Lk w w  and ( ),if K Lk w w−  globally. It is sufficient to assume that no factor intensity reversal 
occurs over a certain range of factor prices. Let ( ) ( ){ }*, , ,j j j jK L g K L xW w w c w w c p≡ =  be the subset 
of factor prices defined by the zero profit condition in outsourcing sector j . We assume that there is 
no factor intensity reversal over jW , i.e.: If ( ) ( )*, , ,i j jf K L g K L xk w w k w w c≷  for some ( ), JK Lw w W∈ , 
then ( ) ( )*, , ,i j jf K L g K L xk w w k w w c′ ′ ′ ′≷  for any ( ), JK Lw w W′ ′ ∈ , 1,2i = . Be aware of the difference to 
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technical progress in the Heckscher-Ohlin model where a global ranking of factor intensities is 
usually assumed. In the case of international outsourcing such a global ranking is in general not 
possible due to the described change in the set of inputs in the production process. 
An immediate implication of our assumption about factor intensity rankings is that 
Definition 4 of the factor-bias of outsourcing describes a global property in the subset iW , where 
sector i  is the outsourcing sector. If outsourcing in sector i  conserves factor L  (factor K ) at factor 
prices ( ), iK Lw w W∈ , it conserves factor L  (factor K ) at any other factor prices ( ), iK Lw w W∈  as 
well. 
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Table 1: Combinations of non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria under 
international outsourcing in the K -intensive sector 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Kw  Lw  /K Lw w  
(K-intensive) 
outsourcing sectorT1 
inactive active inactive active inactive active 
L-outsourcing + + – – + + 
K-outsourcing amb.        +T2 amb.        –T2 amb.T3        +T2 
 
 
Table 2: Outsourcing in the K-intensive sector leading to a diversified 
outsourcing equilibrium 
 
__________________ 
T1 Active/inactive refers to the non-outsourcing equilibrium. 
T2 If the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on production in the K-intensive 
sector, K-outsourcing does not lead to a diversified outsourcing equilibrium. 
T3 One factor gains and one factor loses. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kw  Lw  /K Lw w  
(L-intensive) non-
outsourcing sectorT1 
inactive active inactive active inactive active 
L-outsourcing       
     (a) f and g active +      n.p.T2 –      n.p.T2 +      n.p.T2
     (b) only g activeT3 + + amb. amb. + + 
K-outsourcing       
      (a) f and g active – – + + – – 
      (b) only g activeT3 amb. amb. + amb. – amb. 
 
 
Table 3: Outsourcing in the K-intensive sector leading to an outsourcing equilibrium 
specialized on the K -intensive sector 
 
__________________ 
T1 Active/inactive refers to the non-outsourcing equilibrium. 
T2 If the L-intensive sector is active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium, only the 
outsourcing technology g is in use in a specialized outsourcing equilibrium. 
T3 Both factors may gain from international outsourcing. 
